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ISBN  3–933747–97–XWe present a comparable set of results on the monetary transmission channels on firm
investment for the four largest euro-area countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain).
With particularly rich micro datasets for each country containing over 215,000
observations from 1985 to 1999, we explore what can be learned about the interest
channel and the broad credit channel. For each of those countries, we estimate neo-
classical investment relationships, explaining investment by its user cost, sales and cash
flow. We find investment to be sensitive to user cost changes in all those four countries.
This implies an operative interest channel in these euro-area countries. We also find in-
vestment in all countries to be quite sensitive to cash flow movements. However, only in
Italy do smaller firms react more to cash flow movements than large firms, implying that a
broad credit channel might not be equally pervasive in all countries.
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AbstractIn einer vergleichenden Betrachtung untersuchen wir die Kanäle monetärer Transmission
bezüglich des einzelwirtschaftlichen Investitionsverhaltens in den vier größten Ländern
des Euro-Währungsraums (Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und Spanien). Bei unserer
Untersuchung des Zinskanals und des Kreditkanals können wir auf ausgesprochen reiche
Datensätze mit insgesamt 215.000 Beobachtungen zurückgreifen. Für jedes dieser Länder
schätzen wir neoklassische Investitionsgleichungen, bei denen das Investitionsverhalten
durch die Kapitalnutzungskosten, den Absatz und den cash flow erklärt werden. In allen
vier Ländern reagiert das Investitionsverhalten auf Änderungen der
Kapitalnutzungskosten. Dies zeigt die Wirksamkeit eines Zinskanals in diesen Ländern.
Weiterhin erweist sich in allen Ländern der betriebliche cash flow als wichtige Determi-
nante für das Investitionsverhalten. Allerdings reagieren nur in Italien kleine Firmen
stärker auf Änderungen des cash flows als große Firmen. Dies läßt darauf schließen, daß
der Kreditkanal der monetären Transmission nicht in allen Ländern von gleicher
Bedeutung ist.
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Monetary policy is generally thought to be able to affect business investment through
multiple channels. First, a traditional interest-rate channel is identified, whereby changes
in market interest rates imply changes in the cost of capital, which in turn affect invest-
ment. However, the difficulties of using aggregate data to find clear evidence of this chan-
nel are well known. Second, changes in market interest rates affect the net cash flow (i.e.
cash flow after interest payments) available to a firm. Given imperfect capital markets, the
availability of net cash flow will have an effect on investment. This is generally referred to
as the broad credit channel.
This paper provides an investigation of those two channels based on results from a unique
comparative study of the four largest euro-area countries.
2 Using rich firm databases for
each country, standardised regressions were run to make comparison across countries fea-
sible. Although, for confidentiality reasons, individual data could not be pooled – making
formal statistical testing impossible – the standardisation of the analysis should still allow
asymmetries in the working of the above channels to be detected. In particular, reliance on
firm data should make it possible to identify whether there are differences in the behaviour
of firms with otherwise similar characteristics. This has a distinct advantage over the in-
ference based on aggregate data in which “true” differences in behaviour are potentially
confounded by differences due to composition of the firms in the aggregate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we motivate the analysis and
spell out the relevant questions that can be answered by comparing the results across
countries. In section 3 we describe the theoretical framework. In section 4 we present our
                                                          
1 The e-mail addresses of the authors are, respectively: jean-bernard.chatelain@banque-france.fr;
generale.andrea@insedia.interbusiness.it; hernando@bde.es; ulf.von-kalckreuth@bundesbank.de;
philip.vermeulen@ecb.int. This paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the institutions they are affiliated to. We would like to thank the members
of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Transmission Network and the participants of the monetary eco-
nomics workshop at the NBER Summer Institute 2001 for helpful discussions and feedback, and
especially Daniele Terlizzese for his very helpful comments.
2 Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen (2001) investigate the elasticity of investment with respect to its
user cost using industry data on the same four countries. The MTN project has led to a number of
complementary companion papers on investment and monetary policy: Butzen, Fuss and Vermeu-
len (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and Generale (2001), von Kalckreuth (2001),  
neman and Mathä (2001) and Valderrama (2001).2
data. In section 5 we present the regression results. In section 6 we test whether a broad
credit channel is operative in the euro area. In section 7 we investigate the link between




Since the beginning of monetary union in Europe, a large body of empirical analysis has
been devoted to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These analyses are usu-
ally justified by the observation that a common monetary policy affects economies char-
acterised by a high degree of heterogeneity.
This paper is a contribution to the discussion of monetary policy transmission in the euro
area; it focuses on the four major euro-area countries by using data collected at the na-
tional level. Our perspective is at once wider and narrower than the one motivating previ-
ous research. It is narrower in that we limit our attention to a specific channel of monetary
policy, firms’ investment spending. It is wider in that, by using micro data, we try to take
into account the relevance of firms’ balance-sheet conditions in the transmission of
monetary policy. The contribution of the paper consists mainly in an assessment of the
main determinants of investment spending in each of the countries.
Interest in the transmission mechanism is motivated by a variety of reasons that also can
have policy implications. First, for a careful assessment of the monetary stance in the area,
it is important to know if the pure interest channel is the only channel at work. If agents’
financial conditions are shown to be important, then knowing these conditions proves to
be important for the policy maker; at the same time this knowledge helps to better forecast
the likely effects of a monetary policy decision.
As it is well known, the main channels of monetary policy transmission have been thor-
oughly examined mainly using macro information (see the survey in Guiso, Kashyap,
Panetta and Terlizzese, 1999). These kind of analyses have, on the one hand enabled
regularities and differences across the countries of the euro area to be uncovered; on the
other hand, they have proved to be limited in many respects. First of all, it is known that
aggregation can blur the differences in the transmission of monetary policy and impede
the identification of important parts of the transmission mechanism. Hence, recourse to
micro data is often motivated in the literature by the recognition of the limits of aggregate
studies. In their U.S. study on the relationship between investment spending and the user
cost of capital, Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) motivate the use of micro data by the
very fact that studies at the aggregate level often fail to find an economically significant










Moreover, micro data are also needed because of the “ [in micro data
that] 	
 [for instrumental variable estimation] 
	.” The motivation for employing micro data can be gen-
erally ascribed to the advantages of panel data estimation versus time series estimation,








(Hsiao, 1995). Moreover, in our analysis on the determinants of investment, the use of
micro data allows firm-level measures of the user cost, sales and cash flow, thus taking
into account the fact that the transmission of monetary impulses occurs at the firm level.
In fact, as is well known and indeed very well explained by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer
(1999), one of the difficulties found in the empirical analysis of the relationship between
investment and the user cost is that these estimates usually turn out to be very low. They




















	 .” In this respect, the cross-sectional variation coming from the tax component
in the user cost variable that we use in the estimation can be regarded as an exogenous
source of variation, thus allowing us to identify the effects of the cost of capital on in-
vestment. Moreover, simultaneity problems are reduced by IV or GMM estimation.
Hence, the combination of instrumental variable estimation and the exogenous source of
variability ensured by tax variations should improve our ability to properly identify user
cost effects.
3






	.” This is the case if one wants to precisely
identify the existence of a broad credit channel, i.e. the second channel of monetary
transmission.
                                                          
3 It has to be clarified that we are not pursuing the strategy of research adopted by Cummins et al.
(1994, 1996) that stretched this line of identification as far as to measure investment elasticities to
the user cost in years of major tax reform. At any rate, it is important for us to be sure of having a
sufficient amount of variability in the data due to this tax component.4
The literature on the broad credit channel of monetary policy has emphasised the rele-
vance of information asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy. In particular,
the difficulty faced by lenders in monitoring the projects of “opaque” firms implies that
firms’ financial conditions are important for the availability and cost of external finance.
The result that, given information asymmetries, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not
hold implies also that firms that are likely to be more exposed to problems of asymmetric
information might react more to a monetary tightening (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995).
Analysing the reaction to a common shock of groups of firms characterised by weaker
balance sheets and comparing it to other firms that are in a better financial position solves
the identification problems encountered with the use of macro-data. In particular, whereas
aggregate data are able to identify the relevance of the interest-rate channel, it is only by
analysing the different behaviour of different groups of agent that we are able to robustly
identify the presence of a broad credit channel.
There are also drawbacks in using micro data. They mainly consist in the difficulty of re-
covering aggregate effects from micro estimations. This is mainly caused by the fact that
usually shorter time periods are available in panels, thus implying that variation in the
monetary policy stance can be more limited than with time series data, and that samples
are often biased towards specific types of firms. We are aware of these difficulties: as
documented in the data set description, we are confident that the sample chosen is quite
representative of the firms’ characteristics in each country; moreover, in comparison to
other contributions on panel analysis, we have panels that are quite long. A thorough
comparison of results coming from macro and micro evidence is outside the scope of this
paper.
After this overview, we want to give a picture of the main real and financial characteristics
of these countries. The observation of significant heterogeneities has often motivated the
analysis of the transmission mechanism with the aim of uncovering the presence of
asymmetries in the reaction observed across countries. In effect, a high degree of hetero-
geneity seems to characterise these economies in particular with regard to firms’ financial
structure, the availability of external funds and the industrial structure. Table 1a illustrates
some of these differences.
On the real side, the distribution of firms by size turns out to be quite dissimilar: in Ger-
many only 48 per cent of total turnover of non-financial firms pertained to firms with less
than 250 employees, whereas, at the other extreme, in Italy such firms accounted for 71
per cent.5
As to financial structure, firms differ markedly with respect to both the availability of ex-
ternal funds and the composition of their financial debt. Data collected by the Monetary
Transmission Network show, for example, that reliance on bank credit is highest in Italy,
partly reflecting the more limited role of equity in firm financing; it is much more limited
in the other countries. Spain, a country in an intermediate position as to dependence on
bank debt, also shows a high share of equity financing, in terms of both capital’s and re-
serves’ share of firms’ total liabilities and of stock market capitalisation as a percentage of
GDP. More importantly, for the transmission of monetary policy impulses, the share of
short-term debt differs markedly across countries, with higher values in Italy and Spain.
Looking at recent transaction data, flows in bank loans have substantially exceeded flows
in shares and other equity in Germany, Italy and Spain. France is the exception to this
pattern. It seems to be the country with a lower dependence on bank debt, corroborated by
its relatively high stock market capitalisation.
One obvious question that arises when looking at cross-country differences, then, is
whether these broad institutional characteristics are conducive to a different reaction to
monetary policy. It has to be clarified that the research strategy adopted in this paper is
only able to address partially the issue of asymmetries across countries. We are in fact
mainly interested in documenting the importance of the different transmission mecha-
nisms in each country. Our research strategy is the following: we first estimate investment
equations for each country, giving us the sensitivity of investment to its main determi-
nants: the user cost, sales and cash flow. This permits an assessment of the relative im-
portance of the different channels in each country. Moreover, by calculating the response
of investment determinants to monetary policy we obtain a measure of the elasticity of
investment to monetary policy. The comparison of the results obtained across countries is
needed to understand how the transmission of monetary impulses takes place at the coun-
try level. Moreover, it gives a rough indication of the existence or absence of asymme-
tries. For confidentiality reasons, cross-country comparisons cannot are not performed on
a pooled data set, thus impeding a formal test on the significance of the differences.
We believe, though, that examining the main channels of transmission in each country is
only a first step in assessing the relevance of asymmetries. Consider the case of the broad
credit channel: if financial variables prove to be important in a given country, then there is
evidence that differences in access to financial markets in this country play a role. But, at
the country-by-country analysis stage, finding larger effects of financial variables in one
country does not mean that a broad credit channel is at work. One way to partly address
this issue consists in performing a test of the differences in reaction to investment deter-
minants for firms that are more likely to be subject to information asymmetries. The de-6
tection of significant differences within each country permits us to highlight how wide-
spread heterogeneous behaviour is in the countries we examine. Future research in the
field should seek to carefully assess the quantitative importance of the eventual differ-
ences found and try to trace the observed differences back to the presence of heterogeneity
in behaviour or in the composition of the firms in the economy. Some steps in this direc-
tion are taken by the various country-specific investigations carried out with the MTN,
namely Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and











Bank credit 6.2 7.2 21.2 11.0
Of which:
Maturity of less than 1 year 3.7 3.3 14.3 6.6
Maturity of more than 1 year 2.5 3.9 6.9 4.4
Bonds 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.1







Loans 4.5 2.0 2.0 5.4
Securities other than shares -0.1 0.6 0.0 -0.1
Shares and other equity 1.5 3.4 1.3 2.7





Total financial liabilities of non-financial
firms 128.8 268.4 135.0 209.6
Stock-market capitalisation 39.9 49.5 30.6 56.2
Bonds of non-financial firms 0.1 . 1.6 2.7
(	

Investment/GDP % #$$)*+++")# 22.2 19.0 19.4 23.3
Share of total non-financial firms turnover
attributable to firms with less than 250 em-
ployees #$$%"&#
48.0 56.0 71.0 62.0
(1) Source: BACH data set (European Commission).
(2) Source: Eurostat.
(3) Source: OECD and Eurostat.
 				* 
The investment model we use is derived from the neo-classical demand for capital. It has
recently been estimated using panel data by, among others, Bond, Elston, Mairesse and
Mulkay (1997), Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), and Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay
(1999, 2001). Abstracting from irreversibility, uncertainty, delivery lags and adjustment7
costs, the first order condition for a firm’s optimisation problem leads to the equality be-
tween the marginal product of capital and the user cost of capital  LW , :
() LW LW LW . , - . / = ,,  ( 1 )
where i stands for firm, and t stands for time.
Following Auerbach (1983) and Hayashi (2000), we obtain a weighted-average definition
of the user cost of capital where the cost of debt and equity are weighted with their re-
spective share of the total liabilities of the firm. We use the accounting proportions of debt
and equity which matters for taxation:
] ) 1 ( ) )( ( ) 1 )( ( [
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where  is the sector-specific index,  VW   the price of final goods, 
,
VW   the price of capital
goods of sector s;  W τ  the corporate income tax rate, against which interest payments and
depreciation are assumed to be deductible,   the present value of depreciation allowances,
and  the investment tax credit. AI is the apparent interest rate, measured as interest
payment over gross debt, LD the long-term debt rate used as a proxy for the opportunity
cost of equity, E the book value of equity, and  V δ  the industry-specific rate of economic
depreciation.
In contrast to the King and Fullerton (1984) approach, as used by Harhoff and Ramb
(2001) and von Kalckreuth (2001), this user cost of capital does not take into account the
differences for dividends and retained earnings for households income tax and the distinc-
tion between different capital goods for the computation of the net present value of depre-
ciation allowances.
4
Following Eisner and Nadiri (1968), we parameterise the production function by a con-



















+ = LW L LW L W L LW LW . - ( 2/ - . / ,1 = + L L β α ,( 3 )
where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, ν  represents returns
to scale,  L( 2/  is total factor productivity which we assume to have two components: a
firm-specific one and a year-specific one. Substituting the marginal productivity of capital
in equation (1) yields:
                                                          
4 The user cost variable in von Kalckreuth (2001) models additional details of the German tax code.
However, results in that paper are qualitatively similar to the results presented here.8









+ σ = θ
1
 and  ()
σ ν
σ
να L W L W ( 2/ 3 ⋅ =
− 1
) (  . (5)
LW 4  represents sales. The variable  LW 3  depends on the time-varying term  W (  and the firm-
specific term L 2/ . The elasticity of capital to sales is unity ( 1 = θ ), if the production
function has constant returns to scale ( 1 = ν ), or if its elasticity of substitution is unity
( 1 = σ ), that is, in the Cobb-Douglas case.
We do not assume that (4) always holds; instead, we assume that the firm changes its
capital stock in the direction of a long-run target value K*:
LW LW LW LW 3 , 4 . log log log log
* + − = σ θ ,( 6 )
The long-run target value for capital, K
*, is not observable, which means that to go from
(6) to an empirical specification, we need to specify an adjustment process. We specify an
auto-regressive distributed lag model (ADL(3,3). 
5):
3 3 2 2 1 1 0 3 3 2 2 1 1
0 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 3 3 2 2 1 1
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
+ + + + − −
− − + + + + + + =
LW LW LW LW LW LW LW
LW LW LW LW LW LW LW LW LW
      
        
φ φ φ φ σ σ σ
σ θ θ θ θ ω ω ω
 (7)
where we have used lower case letters to refer to the corresponding level variables in logs.
In the long run, the effects of a permanent change in the explanatory variables in (7) are
assumed to add up to the effect given by (6). This implies that we can identify the long-
run elasticities of sales and user cost. The long-run user cost elasticity with respect to the
stock of capital is given by  ) 1 /( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 ω ω ω σ σ σ σ σ − − − + + + =  and the long-
run sales elasticity with respect to the stock of capital is
) 1 /( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 ω ω ω θ θ θ θ θ − − − + + + = . At this stage, there are two possible strate-
gies. The first one transforms the ADL model into an error-correction model (Hall, Mair-
esse and Mulkay, 1999). The second strategy consists of first differencing the ADL model
(Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer, 1999). The possibility of firm-specific effects not only on
the level of productivity but also on its growth rate may justify this second strategy on
panel data. For simplicity, we will only use the second strategy. We leave the possible
comparison between the two approaches to companion country papers of the Monetary
Transmission Network. First-differencing and using the approximation
δ − = − − − 1 1 / log log W W W W . 1 . . , and replacing productivity by time dummies, a firm-
specific effect and a random term ε  yields:
                                                          
5 Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (1999) consider an ADL(2,2) but do not include the user cost of capi-
tal.9
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We estimate this equation (8). In addition, to be in line with the literature, we also esti-
mate an extension of equation (8). It has been argued frequently that a measure of liquidity
should enter the model to account for access to internal funds that might affect investment
in the presence of financing constraints. Liquidity is usually measured as cash flow (CF).
For comparison with the existing literature, and to avoid unit problems, cash flow enters
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In this section an overview is given of the individual country data used in the regressions.
Definitions of the variables used were made as comparable as possible between the differ-
ent countries. National data sets do differ in many respects. First of all, the way in which
data are collected in each country is not the same. The fact that the prerequisites for en-
tering in the sample are different implies that the representativeness of each sample differs
across countries. In general, the samples are skewed towards larger firms. Moreover,
every sample is unbalanced and differs in the degree in which firms enter and leave the
sample.
In Germany, the Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet database constitutes the largest
collection of accounting data for German non-financial firms;
6 the collection of financial
statements originated from the Bundesbank’s function of performing credit assessments
within the scope of its rediscount operations. On the whole, every year around 70,000 an-
nual accounts were collected, on a strictly confidential basis, by the Bundesbank’s branch
offices. The German data set is probably skewed towards large firms since, according to
the turnover tax statistics, these firms represented roughly 75% of the total turnover of the
West German manufacturing sector, albeit only 8% of the total number of firms.
                                                          
6 A detailed description is contained in Deutsche Bundesbank (1998); see also Friderichs and Sauvé
(1999) and Stöss (2001).10
In France, the data source consists of compulsory accounting tax forms
7 and of additional
information taken from surveys collected by the Banque de France (the database “Centrale
des Bilans”'). Since these data are collected only from firms who are willing to provide
them, French data are likewise skewed towards large firms.
8
Data for Italy are drawn from the Italian Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei
bilanci), that, considering the whole period 1983-1999 and all non-financial enterprises,
contains around 692,000 observations, for around 40,000 firms per year. Also for Italy
there exists a bias towards large firms, since firms are not randomly drawn: in fact, the
prerequisite for entering the sample is that each firm has to be indebted with a bank;
moreover, preference is given to firms with multiple lending relationships.
9
The Spanish data were obtained from the Central Balance Sheet Office of the Banco de
España (CBBE), and, in particular, from the Annual Central Balance Sheet Database
(CBA); this database is compiled through the voluntary collaboration of non-financial
firms and is edited by means of contacts with them. Thus, it only covers those firms that
voluntarily complete the questionnaire and is biased towards large and manufacturing
firms. The initial database included 115,980 observations corresponding to 22,014 firms
over the 1983-1999 period. In 1994, its coverage of the non-financial firms sector, in
terms of value added, was around 35 %.
10
For the econometric analysis, a smaller data set was used in each country. The loss in ob-
servations was due to the following reasons. First, we limited the analysis to the manu-
facturing sector, for which data for the calculation of the capital stock at replacement cost
appeared to be more reliable. Second, applying the perpetual inventory formula and using
investment over lagged capital as a regressor meant dropping the first year-firm observa-
tions. Third, trimming (see appendix) and selecting firms which are consecutively present
in the sample at least during five years in order to use a sufficient number of lags as ex-
planatory variables led to the final sample in each country.
Some specificities in each country are worth mentioning: for the German sample, which
originally contained unincorporated businesses, we have excluded sole proprietorships and
unincorporated partnerships because of differences in accounting rules;
11 this permits a
higher degree of comparability with the other countries. Again for reasons of comparabil-
                                                          
7 They are collected by the Banque de France in the database FIBEN.
8 Small firms of less than 20 employees are underrepresented. No statistical sampling procedure has
been used to correct this bias.
9 Moreover, since the information collected is meant to be a service for banks in deciding their
credit policies, the sample is biased towards firms that are creditworthy.
10 For a more detailed description of this database, see Banco de España (2000).
11 All publicly-owned enterprises were discarded, too, as they might not be profit-oriented.11
ity, we only consider West German manufacturing firms, and we confine ourselves to the
years 1988 - 1997.
12 In Italy, we discarded the firms for which information to construct the
user cost (i. e. fiscal data) was not available.
In general, we ended up with samples that, though skewed towards larger firms, are still
representative of the manufacturing sector of each economy. Moreover, very often, bal-
ance sheet data only contain large and listed firms, whereas in our sample the median
number of employees is 118 in Germany, 31 in Italy, 50 in Spain, and 55 in France. This
means also that the data set covers unlisted companies, which are probably the best candi-
dates to test for balance-sheet effects, quite well; listed companies represent less than 4
per cent of the sample in Spain, less than 2 in Italy, and less than 6 in Germany and
France. Moreover, firms are spread throughout the sectors of manufacturing
13.
In each country, the period covered by the samples used in estimation is 1985-1999, with
the exception of Germany for which the time period available for estimation is 1988-1997.
The total number of observations and the number of years available are comparable to or
higher than those of the sample used by Chirinko et al. (1999) for US firms.
14 For the
European samples, coverage, calculated on the total number of employees in the manu-
facturing sector, ranges from 19 per cent for Spain to 45 per cent for Germany
15.
Table 1b shows the investment-capital ratio, real sales growth, real user cost growth, cash
flow on capital, and log of the user cost level in each country. Overall, as is usually the
case with panel data, there is a wide dispersion of the variables used in all countries. The
mean of the investment capital ratio is higher in Germany (0.181) and Spain (0.186) than
in France (0.122) and Italy (0.124). The high mean of the investment capital ratio in Spain
is matched by a high average sales growth (0.043). This contrasts with Germany where
average sales growth is the lowest of all four countries (0.021). Average user cost growth
over the period differs quite substantially across the four countries. In Germany user costs
increased on average by 2.5 percent, while in Italy they decreased on average by 1.2 per-
                                                          
12 Earlier years are affected by the radical regulatory changes in accounting introduced in 1985,
triggered by an EU directive on the harmonisation of financial statements.
13 The wider time dimension of these databases makes them preferable to other data sets containing
a larger number of firms, which are often available in the countries examined. For example, in Italy
the CERVED database contains information on balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of all
firms excluding sole proprietorships (roughly 500,000 firms), but the first year available is 1993.
14 They had a sample of 26,071 observations ranging from 1981 to 1991 with a total number of
firms of 4,095.
15 For Germany, coverage calculated over total turnover of the sector in 1996 was 38.4% percent of
the turnover of the whole sector. The analysis of the distribution by size indicates that a large por-
tion of small and medium sized enterprises that make up the core of West German industry is pres-
ent in the sample. Moreover, the sample mirrors the West German industrial structure relatively
well.12
cent. On average, the ratio of cash flow over capital is higher in Spain (0.37) and France







+ ' 	 -,	  &./ 	 0./ $
12%
Germany 0.181 0.219 0.000 0.059 0.116 0.216 2.291
France 0.122 0.141 0.000 0.039 0.080 0.151 1.430
Italy 0.124 0.155 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.151 3.300
Spain 0.186 0.217 -0.033 0.049 0.117 0.240 1.560
!-
Germany 0.021 0.158 -0.596 -0.058 0.021 0.107 0.828
France 0.029 0.153 -1.780 -0.051 0.029 0.112 1.360
Italy 0.034 0.196 -2.400 -0.060 0.035 0.131 3.000
Spain 0.043 0.171 -0.660 -0.051 0.041 0.136 0.780
!3
Germany 0.025 0.110 -0.356 -0.044 0.025 0.091 0.422
France -0.009 0.140 -0.339 -0.107 -0.014 0.089 0.362
Italy -0.012 0.263 -2.100 -0.150 -0.008 0.126 1.700
Spain 0.006 0.150 -0.380 -0.107 0.011 0.113 0.510
 '12%
Germany 0.276 0.464 -1.191 0.109 0.188 0.325 9.268
France 0.330 0.330 -0.450 0.160 0.260 0.410 4.320
Italy 0.196 0.220 -1.200 0.090 0.152 0.244 4.500
Spain 0.370 0.469 -1.100 0.126 0.256 0.471 5.000
4!3
Germany -1.865 0.182 -2.572 -1.984 -1.859 -1.738 -1.126
France -1.770 0.140 -2.260 -1.860 -1.770 -1.670 -1.270
Italy -1.870 0.272 -3.500 -2.000 -1.860 -1.710 -0.900





Germany 40,362 5,876 1989-1997
France 61,237 6,946 1985-1999
Italy 94,523 8,019 1985-1999






In this section we present regression results for the specifications reported in equations (8)
and (9). We first present estimation results using the WITHIN estimator. We then present
estimation results using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Table 2 reports the results obtained with the WITHIN estimator. We include a full set of
time dummies. These will capture the effect of macro influences on firm-specific invest-
ment. We dropped the lagged dependent variable for two reasons. First, it is known that
the WITHIN estimator is biased with certainty when lagged dependent variables are pres-
ent (Nickell, 1981). This bias is due to the correlation of the transformed residual with the13
transformed lagged dependent variable. Second, in this way we can directly compare our
WITHIN estimation results with those obtained for US data by Chirinko, Fazzari and
Meyer (1999) using a panel of 4,095 manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms from
1981-91 representing 48% of aggregate US non-residential investment in 1987. (See their
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SI,t 0.126 (0.008)** 0.107 (0.005)** 0.075 (0.004)** 0.080 (0.014)**
I,t-1 0.121 (0.009)** 0.099 (0.005)** 0.072 (0.003)** 0.077 (0.013)**
I,t-2 0.097 (0.097)** 0.059 (0.005)** 0.048 (0.004)** 0.042 (0.013)**






;<;0";;&&#== ;);.";;#== ;&&>";;;#== ;&)0";;))#==
UCi,t -0.230 (0.013)** -0.211 (0.007)** -0.144 (0.003)** -0.187 (0.029)**
	
i,t-1 -0.213 (0.014)** -0.110 (0.007)** -0.095 (0.003)** 0.024 (0.030)
	
i,t-2 -0.107 (0.013)** -0.046 (0.007)** -0.052 (0.003)** 0.048 (0.030)
	






%;?);";;&&#== %;)>&";;)#== %;)>";;;#== -;;@&";;?<#
No. of obs. 22,734 33,453 62,447 8,855
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Time dummies are included.
For all countries, sales have a substantial effect in the long run on the capital stock. We
obtain long-term sales elasticities ranging from 0.407 in Germany to 0.228 in Italy. Also
for all countries, the contemporaneous effect of sales is the largest, ranging from 0.126 in
Germany to 0.075 in Italy. All lags of sales growth (up to t-3) have a significant effect on
investment. This could be due to many different reasons, including installation lags or
adjustment cost. Chirinko et al. (1999) found a rather similar long-run sales elasticity of
0.322 with a contemporaneous effect of 0.120 for the U.S.
For all countries except Spain, also the user cost has a significant effect on the capital
stock in the long run. We obtain user cost elasticities ranging from –0.63 in Germany to –
0.318 in Italy.
16 Chirinko et al. (1999) found a long-run user cost elasticity of -0.721. In
every country (including the U.S.), except for Spain, these long-term user cost elasticities
are even higher than the long-term sales elasticities. Again, the contemporaneous effect is
the largest and past user cost changes are generally significant. This provides evidence
against simple sales-accelerator models that only include sales and exclude user costs. It is
                                                          
16 The sign and dimension of these two effects are similar to those obtained using specifications
with a different lag structure and are similar to those reported in the paper by Gaiotti and Generale
that employ a data set that contains non-manufacturing Italian firms as well.14
important to note that even for Spain, although the long-run user cost elasticity (UCE) is
not significant, the contemporaneous user cost effect is clearly negative and significant.
Moreover, in a more parsimonious specification, removing the insignificant lags, the point
estimates of the remaining regressors do not significantly change and the long-run user
cost elasticity is larger, in absolute value, and significant.
Due to simultaneity between investment and the user cost, the WITHIN estimates might
be biased towards zero. This problem, of course, can be generalised to a potential simulta-
neity between all variables in the regression.
Therefore, we also present the results using the GMM first difference estimator of Arel-
lano-Bond (1991). This time we include the lagged dependent variable. We use as instru-
ments the lagged variables used in the regression from t-2 onwards. The results are in Ta-
ble 3.
For all countries, with the partial exception of Spain, the long-run sales elasticities are
similar to the WITHIN results. The point estimates increase somewhat for Germany,
France and Italy, and decrease for Spain, but the effect of sales on capital remains statisti-
cally significant. The effect of sales on investment is clearly a robust feature in every
country.
What is striking, however, is how the point estimates of the long-run user cost elasticities
change when moving to GMM. These differences are non-uniform across countries. The
GMM results show a slightly higher point estimate of the long-run user cost elasticity for
Germany (-0.663), a dramatically lower one for France (-0.106) and Italy (-0.111) and a
dramatically higher one for Spain (-.259).
So far these are the results obtained by means of a common specification. Before pro-
ceeding it is worth mentioning some robustness checks made for each country. Compari-
son with other results is obtained either by running regressions with a slightly modified set
of instruments (results not shown) or by taking stock of the results presented in the com-
panion papers of the Monetary Transmission project.
For Germany, the AR(2) statistics in the specification presented in Table 3 show that there
might be an autocorrelation problem in the residuals. It is interesting to note that, using
King-Fullerton user costs, von Kalckreuth (2001) obtains a smaller user cost elasticity of
0.522 for the same model. For France, the significance level of the elasticity of I/K to the
user cost turns out to be dependent on the choice of instruments. For Italy, a sensitivity
analysis of the results obtained with this specification was conducted by trying different
instrument sets. By using a more parsimonious set of instruments, excluding lags 2 and 3
of the user cost, the long-run effect of the user cost is -.234, more similar to the outcome15
of the WITHIN regression. Moreover, the Sargan test accepts the set of instruments at a
higher confidence level. The effect of sales is similar to the one observed in Table 3. For
Spain, the use of a more parsimonious specification leads again to more precise estimates.
When removing insignificant lags, the point estimates of the remaining regressors do not
significantly vary and the standard errors for the long-run elasticities are significantly
lower. In particular, the point estimate for the long-run sales elasticity is 0.098 with a
standard error of 0.039, and the point estimate of the long-run user cost elasticity is –
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II,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.142 (0.017)** 0.024 (0.061) 0.176 (0.007)** 0.123 (0.019)**
II,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.010 (0.009) 0.050 (0.011)* 0.022 (0.005)** -0.004 (0.014)
II,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.008 (0.007) 0.029 (0.006)* 0.017 (0.005)** 0.001 (0.012)
Σ  Ii,t-n/Ki,t-n-1 ;?;";;&?#== ;;)";;)#= ;&.";;)#== ;&;";;).#==
Si,t 0.162 (0.053)** 0.073 (0.035)* 0.117 (0.032)* 0.038 (0.064)
i,t-1 0.106 (0.013)** 0.086 (0.009)* 0.062 (0.040)** 0.041 (0.017)**
i,t-2 0.069 (0.011)** 0.137 (0.008)* 0.033 (0.005)** 0.027 (0.014)*
i,t-3 0.042 (0.010)** 0.014 (0.006)* 0.013 (0.005)** 0.018 (0.012)






;<.&";;0)#== ;)<?";;)?#= ;&>?";;<@#== ;<";;>.#=
UCi,t -0.286 (0.089)** -0.055 (0.026)* -0.045 (0.016)** -0.274 (0.135)**
	
i,t-1 -0.170 (0.029)** -0.045 (0.019)* -0.027 (0.008)** -0.003 (0.041)*
	
i,t-2 -0.072 (0.021)** -0.002 (0.011) -0.011 (0.005)* 0.032 (0.035)
	
i,t-3 -0.029 (0.015) 0.007 (0.007) -0.004 (0.004) 0.017 (0.028)






%;??)";?0#== %;;?";;<>#= %;";;)@#== %;&.@";&;#
No. of obs. 16,858 33,453 62,447 8,855
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034
Sargan-Hansen test 69.81 (p=0.29) 105.12 (p=0.09) 126.80 (p=0.09) 127.26 (p=0.09)
AR(1) 13.74** -6.51 ** -30.90 ** -14.37**
AR(2) -2.03 (p=0.04)* -2.17 (p=0.03)* 0.08 (p=0.99) -0.19 (p=0.85)
Estimation method: 2-step GMM estimates, including time dummies
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.
Instruments: Germany: lags 2 and earlier of I/K,   	
 
and  	




It is important to investigate whether the sales and user cost elasticities are sensitive to
adding cash flow to the regression. Since Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) it is usual
to enter cash flow in the regression to allow for liquidity constraints. The results estimated
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Ii,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.124 (0.017)** 0.086 (0.010)** 0.168 (0.011)** 0.120 (0.021)**
Ii,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.002 (0.009) 0.016 (0.007)* 0.024 (0.006)** 0.007 (0.014)
Ii,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.005 (0.007) 0.014 (0.006)* 0.018 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.012)
Σ  Ii,t-n/Ki,t-n-1 ;)";;&?#== ;?";;))#== ;&;?";;?#== ;)0";;)>#==
Si,t 0.142 (0.054)** 0.031 (0.040) 0.045 (0.033) -0.043 (0.063)
i,t-1 0.097 (0.014)** 0.055 (0.009)** 0.039 (0.006)** 0.028 (0.018)
i,t-2 0.061 (0.011)** 0.017 (0.007)* 0.018 (0.005)** 0.014 (0.014)
i,t-3 0.036 (0.010)** 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.004) 0.016 (0.013)






;)>0";;00#== ;&<";;<?#== ;)>";;.;#** ;;>";;>0#
UCi,t -0.220 (0.080)** 0.002 (0.030) -0.079 (0.021)** -0.279 (0.126)**
	
i,t-1 -0.151 (0.028)** -0.030 (0.03) -0.055 (0.017)** -0.018 (0.040)
	
i,t-2 -0.060 (0.020)** 0.002 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) 0.036 (0.034)
	
i,t-3 -0.021 (0.015) 0.002 (0.007) -0.006 (0.005) 0.021 (0.027)






%;.&";<>#== %;;&0";;)@# %;&;<";;?;#== %;&0>";@>#
CFi,t/Ki,t-1 0.043 (0.036) 0.056 (0.030)* 0.255 (0.035)** 0.121 (0.032)**
CFi,t-1/Ki,t-2 0.011 (0.012) 0.091 (0.015)** -0.025 (0.019) 0.037 (0.022)*
CFi,t-2/Ki,t-3 0.011 (0.006) 0.018 (0.007)** 0.008 (0.007) -0.019 (0.009)**
CFi,t-3/Ki,t-4 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 0.000 (0.006) -0.006 (0.008)






;;0@";;)#= ;@?";;)@#== ;);";;&>#== ;.)";;)0#==
No. of obs. 16,858 33,453 62,447 8,855
No. of firms 5,876 6,946 8,019 2,034
Sargan-Hansen test 91.80 (p=0.29) 133.40 (p=0.43) 127.20 (p=0.40) 149.81 (p=0.17)
AR(1) 13.72** -24.60** -30.10** -14.62**
AR(2) 2.08 (p=0.04)* 1.21 (p=0.23) -0.18 (p=0.86) 0.13 (p= 0.90)
Estimation method: 2-step GMM estimates, including time dummies
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.
Instruments: Germany: lags 2 and earlier of all explanatory variables; France: lags 2 to 5 of I/K,
CF/K and ∆ log S, and lags 3 to 5 of ∆ log UC; Spain: lags 2 to 5 of I/K, CF/K and ∆ log UC, and
lags 2 to 4 of ∆ log S; Italy: I/K lags 2 to 6;   	


As is generally the case in the empirical literature, the cash flow capital ratio enters sig-
nificantly and with a positive sign. The total effect of cash flow on I/K ranges from a low
of 0.079 in Germany to a high of 0.301 in Italy. The higher coefficient with respect to
those obtained in the other countries could indicate that firms’ balance-sheet conditions
are relatively important in Italy.
17 Also, the sales elasticity goes down substantively for all
                                                          
17 On the other hand, as is well discussed by Bond et al. (1997), a positive effect of cash flow on
investment does not necessarily reflect the presence of financial constraints. If higher cash flows
are a good predictor of high activity in the future, it may very well be that a positive relationship
between investment and cash flow does not reflect the existence of financial constraints. To par-
tially address this criticism, the regression for Italy was re-run using liquidity stock as a measure of
firms’ balance-sheet conditions. This variable should be less correlated with expectations of future17
countries. Since cash flow might be a proxy for future profitability and future sales, this
result was to be expected. Likewise, in the former regression, the sales variable might
have picked up some effects that should really have been attributed to liquidity and prof-
its. The long-run user cost elasticities are different with respect to the former GMM re-
sults. They are lower for Germany and Italy if for those countries we compare the results
obtained using the same set of instruments, and they are close to zero for France.
The change in the long-run user cost elasticity when cash flow is entered into the regres-
sion can be explained by how the user cost was constructed. The apparent interest-rate
variable used for constructing the user cost of capital is interest payments divided by the
amount of debt. This induces a correlation with cash flow, of which interest payments also









Overall, the results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 suggest that sales, user cost and cash flow are all
important determinants of investment. That user cost enters significantly in investment
regressions is an important result, since it is the prerequisite for an interest-rate channel.
The finding that (for most countries) the user cost elasticity varies substantially according
to estimation method and specification is less satisfying. (Note that this is also the case for
the U.S. in Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999).) However, given that the user cost is a
rather elusive variable, this is not too surprising.
+ 						
In this section we test whether small and large firms show different investment behaviour.
We are especially interested in differences in the coefficient estimates of the cash flow
capital ratio. By testing whether the long-run effect of the cash flow capital ratio is signifi-
cantly different for small firms than for large firms, we are able to compare the behaviour
of firms that are likely to be characterised by weaker balance sheets with that of other
firms.











                                                                                                                                                               
demand conditions: results (not reported) indicate that liquidity, too, has a positive and significant









Sample comparisons using size as a discriminating characteristic of the balance-sheet
conditions of firms are commonly used in the empirical literature that has examined the
link between financial constraints and investment spending (see Schiantarelli, 1995 for a
discussion). Smaller firms are more likely to be less collateralised, to be more opaque to-
wards external investors and, insofar as age is correlated with small size, have less estab-
lished contacts with lenders, thus making it more difficult to distinguish between good and
bad firms. Other characteristics that have been commonly used in these tests are dividend
payout behaviour, group membership, the nature of the bank-firm relationship, and the
degree of ownership concentration. In particular circumstances and in some countries,
these characteristics may very well be more important than size. In fact, as Schiantarelli





Analysis of the institutional characteristics that in each country can blur the relevance of
the size split is beyond the scope of this paper. In the companion papers that focus on sin-
gle country evidence, other firm characteristics that might prove relevant for the transmis-
sion of monetary policy shocks via the balance sheet are analysed. (See, for example,
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) for France, von Kalckreuth (2001) for Germany, Valderrama
(2001) for Austria, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001) for Belgium and Gaiotti and Gen-
erale (2001) for Italy). We present here only the size split results since these are probably
more easily comparable across countries.
Table 5 contains the regression results of equation (9) when allowing for different coeffi-
cients for user cost growth, sales growth and the cash flow capital ratio for large and small
firms. With the exception of Italy, we find no systematic differences between large and
small firms across countries. This is the case for both the sales and user cost elasticities
and for the effect of cash flow. The point estimates of the differences in elasticities are
non-systematically positive or negative and usually non-significant.
For Italy, the sum of the cash flow coefficients for small firms is significantly higher than
for large firms. The fact that balance-sheet conditions are more important for firms that
are probably more exposed to problems of information asymmetries seems to confirm the
existence of a broad credit channel in Italy. These results seem robust to different model19
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!  0.337 (0.086)** 0.073 (0.032)* 0.108 (0.051)* 0.040 (0.012)**
,-74!	 %;;&@";&.# ;;<&";;<;# ;;&0";;0@#= %;;)";;&#
UCi, large firms -0.512 (0.173)** -0.053 (0.040) -0.238 (0.060)** -0.153 (0.082)*
,-74!	 ;;?)";&..# ;;.0";>;# ;;&<";;@># ;;0&";?0#
CF/K large firms 0.092 (0.038)* 0.221(0.030)** 0.196 (0.027)** 0.116 (0.021)**
,-74!	 %;;.;";;.;# %;;).";;)# ;<<";;<.#== ;;);";;))#
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.
We think however that it would be too early to conclude that the broad credit channel is
only operative in Italy. Clearly, more sophisticated sample splits might provide significant
differences across firms belonging to different groups. The results in Table 5 do indicate
that identifying the broad credit channel by only taking into account the size classification
might be an oversimplification in most euro-area countries. Size might not be a sufficient
or even correct indicator for some countries of informational asymmetries that are the ba-
sis for broad credit channel effects.
Indeed, as already noted above, the companion papers to this research project address the
issue of heterogeneity across firms under many other different dimensions. For Germany,
when firms’ ratings are used as a proxy of financial constraints, it turns out that those with
a lower rating are more sensitive to financial variables (von Kalckreuth, 2001). For
France, firms belonging to the equipment goods sector, firms with a lower rating and firms
with a high share of trade credit in the balance sheet are also more sensitive to cash flow
(Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001). In addition, for France, the introduction of dummy variables
which isolate firms that are more sensitive to cash flow has the effect of shifting back the
user cost elasticity to its level obtained without cash flow, i.e. a significant value below -
0.1. For Italy, firms with a high share of intangible assets over total assets, an indication of
the extent of asymmetric information, respond more to variables that approximate their
financial condition (Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). Moreover, results for other countries that
we do not analyse by means of a common specification point to the presence of heteroge-
neity. For Austria, the existence of a “Hausbank” (main bank) significantly affects the
transmission of monetary impulses. Valderrama (2001) finds that firms having closer re-
lationships with the main bank react less to cash flow and more to the user cost than firms
with less “intense” relationships. In Luxembourg, younger firms seem more exposed to
liquidity constraints, measured by means of various financial ratios (Lünnemann and
Mathä, 2001). For Belgium, Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen (2001) document a high degree20











In this section, we first analyse the dynamics of the regression equation. We then perform
a more complicated simulation exercise to determine the elasticity of investment with re-
spect to user cost, sales and cash flow. We finally determine the elasticity of investment
with respect to the market interest rate.
 We use the point estimates of the coefficients as presented in Table 4. In the following,
we present the short run time profile of I/K in the presence of simple shocks to the
explanatory variables and compare these profiles over the four European countries.
Consider the following experiment. Imagine a firm for which user cost growth, sales
growth, CF/K and I/K are all at their steady state path. Next, imagine one single shock at
time t to user cost growth, e.g. user cost growth at time t is equal to its steady state path
value plus 0.01, and that after time t user cost growth is again at its steady state path. What
happens to I/K at time t, t+1, etc., 

	/5.		? A similar experiment can
be performed for real sales growth (again holding the other variables at their steady state),
or for CF/K.
Note that one could object to this type of analysis on multiple grounds. First, user cost
growth, sales growth and CF/K are all endogenous, implying that shocks to one variable
might have immediate or lagged effects on the other variables. Basically, the regression
equation is just one equation describing I/K. In reality, the behaviour of all relevant vari-
ables should be described with a multi-equation system. This, however, is outside the
scope of this paper. Second, the regression equation contains the capital stock at both the
left-hand side and right-hand side (I/K and CF/K). Since movements in I/K will ultimately
move K, CF/K will also change (unless CF moves by the same amount as K). In this first
exercise, we also abstract from this second objection (hence implicitly letting CF move at
the same rate of K when holding CF/K constant.).
Given the above two objections, we still believe the experiment to be of value. First, it
provides a description of the dynamics of the equation concentrating on one variable at a
time. Second, more complicated experiments in which shocks to certain variables coincide
with (lagged) shocks to other variables are just linear combinations of the above simple
                                                          
18 We want to thank Daniele Terlizzese for a patient and productive discussion of the issues in-
volved.21
experiments. For instance, if one considers a simultaneous shock to sales growth and
CF/K, then one can simply add the effects on I/K.
We consider two types of shocks for this experiment. We first consider a shock of 1% (i.e.
the explanatory variable at time t has the value of its steady state plus 0.01). It is necessary
to see that such a  shock to the growth rates of user costs or sales corresponds to
a 
 shock to the level of this variable. We next consider a shock which has a
magnitude of one standard deviation of the within-firm variation of the variable. We find
this last shock especially appealing because it represents a shock relative to the ‘normal’
variation present in the variable in our data. We indeed find that the within-firm variation
of user cost growth, sales growth and CF/K is much larger than 1% and differs substan-
tially across variables and across countries.
Tables 6.1-6.3 present the deviation of I/K from its steady state path after those two types
of shocks, adopting as a benchmark the specification presented in Table 4. Table 6.1
shows the change in I/K after a 1% (column 1) or one standard deviation shock (column 2)
in user cost growth. Most of the effects take place within the first two years. A 1% in-
crease in user cost growth has the largest effect in Spain and Germany. Misleadingly, the
magnitude of the effect seems small. However, in the data, a one standard deviation
change in the user cost growth rate is much larger than 1%; it is 10.6% in Germany,
13.7% in France, 26.1% in Italy and 14.5% in Spain. In the first period, a rise in the user
cost growth in Germany of one standard deviation depresses I/K by 2.33 percentage
points. Given the level of average gross investment per unit of capital of 0.181 in Ger-
many, this translates into a drop to 0.1577 (i.e. 0.181-0.0233). Similar larger effects can be
observed in Italy and Spain. The comparison between columns 1 and 2 reveal some inter-
esting features of the data and the regression result. We can interpret the regression equa-
tion as a description of investment behaviour in the period of investigation. Then it is clear
that two distinct features have determined this behaviour: the magnitude of the reaction of
the I/K ratio to shocks to the explanatory variables, and the magnitude of those shocks.
For instance, whereas the contemporaneous reaction to identical user cost growth shocks
in Italy was much smaller than in Germany (as evidenced in column 1), Italian user cost
growth shocks were on average much larger than German shocks. Combining those two
features implies similar behaviour of the I/K ratio after a one standard deviation shock (as
evidenced in column 2). Note that our regressions are conditional on the historical varia-
tion in the data. This historical variation from the time before EMU could be quite differ-







Germany France Italy Spain
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
T -0.22 -2.33 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -2.06 -0.28 -4.05
t+1 -0.18 -1.88 -0.03 -0.41 -0.07 -1.78 -0.05 -0.75
t+2 -0.08 -0.84 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.90 0.03 0.40
t+3 -0.04 -0.38 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.39 0.02 0.31
A 1 standard deviation increase in the user cost growth is equal to 0.106 in Germany, 0.137 in
France, 0.261 in Italy and 0.145 in Spain.
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points
after a 1% and one standard deviation increase in the user cost growth.
Table 6.2 shows the change in I/K after both a 1% (column 1) or one standard deviation
shock (column 2) in sales growth. Again, the largest effects can be observed in the first
two years. The sales effect is largest in Germany. A one standard deviation increase in the
growth rate of sales increases the I/K ratio by 2.26% in the same year.
Table 6.3 shows the change in I/K after a 1% (column 1) or one standard deviation shock
(column 2) in the CF/K ratio. The contemporaneous effects are quite large. They are the
smallest in Germany. Investment in Italian and Spanish firms, in particular, seems to move







Germany France Italy Spain
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
T 0.16 2.26 0.03 0.44 0.05 0.84 -0.04 -0.68
t+1 0.12 1.77 0.06 0.81 0.05 0.87 0.02 0.36
t+2 0.08 1.16 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.26
t+3 0.04 0.59 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.28
A 1 standard deviation increase in sales growth is equal 0.145 in Germany, 0.141 in France, 0.187
in Italy and 0.159 in Spain.
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points
after a 1% and one standard deviation increase in sales growth.
The regression equation ‘explains’ I/K in terms of user cost growth, sales growth and the
CF/K ratio. However, the reader might find it more natural to think of the level of invest-
ment in terms of the level of user cost, sales or cash flow. After some algebra, the regres-
sion equation can also be used to calculate the elasticity of investment (I) with respect to
the user cost, sales or cash flow. For example, by the elasticity of investment with respect
to the user cost, we mean the percentage change of investment (i.e. I, not I/K) due to a
‘permanent’ 1% change (from the base path) in the user cost level. The wording ‘perma-23
nent’ is important here. As in the first set of simulations given by Tables 6.1-6.3, a perma-
nent change in the user cost level (from the base path) is given by a one-time 1% change






Germany France Italy Spain
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
T 0.04 1.28 0.06 1.29 0.26 3.90 0.12 3.74
t+1 0.02 0.47 0.10 2.21 0.02 0.27 0.05 1.59
t+2 0.01 0.40 0.03 0.63 0.02 0.26 -0.01 -0.37
t+3 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.18
A 1 standard deviation increase in the cash flow capital ratio is equal to 0.305 in Germany, 0.231 in
France, 0.153 in Italy and 0.309 in Spain.
Figures in columns (1) and (2), respectively, represent the deviation of I/K in percentage points
after a 1% and one standard deviation increase in the cash flow capital ratio.
Tables 7.1-7.3 provide the elasticity of investment with respect to (the levels of) user cost,
sales and cash flow. A substantive elasticity of investment with respect to its user cost is a
necessary condition for an interest channel to be operative. As evidenced in Table 7.1, the
elasticity of contemporaneous investment with respect to the user cost is quite large in
Germany (-1.21), Italy (-0.63) and Spain (-1.49). It is negligible in France (0.02), but be-
comes non-negligible in the year after (-0.24). The elasticity at time t+1 remains substan-
tive in Germany, Italy and Spain, but is smaller. Overall, Table 7.1 provides evidence of a







Germany France Italy Spain
T -1.21 0.02 -0.63 -1.49
T+1 -1.17 -0.24 -0.59 -0.48
T+2 -0.79 -0.03 -0.36 -0.05
T+3 -0.61 0.00 -0.21 -0.06
Table 7.2 presents the elasticity of investment with respect to sales. The contemporaneous
elasticities are 0.86 for Germany, 0.25 for France, 0.36 for Italy and
-0.23 for Spain. Surprisingly in Germany, Italy and Spain, investment seems to have a
lower contemporaneous elasticity with respect to sales than with respect to its user cost.
Given the emphasis on the sales accelerator model and the general ignoring of user cost in
the investment literature, this is a provocative result. Although sales growth does undenia-







Germany France Italy Spain
T 0.86 0.25 0.36 -0.23
T+1 0.82 0.50 0.40 0.09
T+2 0.69 0.25 0.27 0.08
T+3 0.54 0.15 0.17 0.10
Table 7.3 provides the elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow. Due to the past
CF/K ratios in the regression, the effect of a permanent increase in cash flow gradually
evolves and accumulates over time. The picture that emerges is mixed. In Germany and







Germany France Italy Spain
T 0.06 0.15 0.40 0.24
T+1 0.10 0.42 0.46 0.38
T+2 0.13 0.54 0.52 0.39
T+3 0.16 0.60 0.55 0.42
To understand the effect of monetary policy on investment Tables 7.1-7.3 are not suffi-
cient. A relevant question is: ‘How do market interest rates affect user costs and cash flow
in those four euro-area countries’?
19 Essentially, the interest channel or ‘cash flow chan-
nel’ works through two stages. In the first stage, the market interest rate has to change
firm fundamentals (user cost, and cash flow). In the second stage, these firm fundamentals
have an effect on investment with the elasticities as presented in Tables 7.1-7.3. Below we
present some evidence on the first stage and show how, combined with the second stage,
the channels of monetary policy differ across countries.
We first investigate the effect of market interest rate changes on the user cost. The first
important fact that should be noted is that interest rates form a part of the user cost of
capital. The importance or weight of this part depends on the importance of the other parts
such as depreciation and relative price changes. Since the user cost directly contains an
interest rate in its definition, the elasticity of the user cost with respect to the interest rate
can therefore be calculated directly. It is equal to:
                                                          
19 Another relevant question is: ‘How do market interest rates affect sales?’ We do not attempt to
answer that question. Interest-rate shocks do not have a ‘mechanical’ effect on sales in the same
way as interest-rate shocks have on user cost and cash flow (interest rates are part of user costs, and
interest payments are part of cash flow). Although interest rates can influence firm-specific demand
(e.g., for investment goods or durable consumer goods producing firms), this demand effect is
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The elasticity is simply the weight of the interest rate in the user cost definition. Hence, if
depreciation or changes in relative prices are large, interest changes will have a small ef-
fect on the user cost. Table 8 shows the relative importance of the interest rate in the user
cost definition in the different countries for an average firm in the data set. It is relatively
high in Spain and Italy, somewhat lower in France and lowest in Germany. Therefore,





















∂ -0.32 -0.28 -0.60 -0.47
We now consider the effect of a permanent 1% change in the market interest rate through
the user cost. Note that by this we mean, for example, a change in the interest rate from
5% to 5.05%, not from 5% to 6%. Table 8 shows us how much the user cost will change
permanently. So, for instance, a 1% permanent increase in the market interest rate leads to
a user cost change of 0.32% in Germany and 0.70% in Italy. Combining this with the re-
sults of Table 7.1 gives us the dynamic effects on investment of a 1% change in the
market interest rate. The results are presented in Table 9.
We find relatively large effects in Germany, Italy and Spain. If one were to consider, e.g.,
a 50 basis points increase in a market interest rate from 5% to 5.50%, one would have to
multiply the numbers in Table 9 by 10. Such a policy experiment would lead to contempo-










Germany France Italy Spain
T -0.39 0.01 -0.44 -0.97
T+1 -0.38 -0.14 -0.41 -0.31
T+2 -0.25 -0.02 -0.25 -0.04
T+3 -0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.0426
We also investigate the effect of a permanent change in the market interest rate on cash
flow. Since interest payments are a flow, they decrease cash flow. When firms have higher
interest payments to make, they have lower cash flow, ceteris paribus. The elasticity of
cash flow with respect to the interest rate can also be calculated directly. It is equal to:
()
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The elasticity is equal to the inverse coverage ratio, i.e. interest payments over cash flow.
The higher the inverse coverage ratio is, the higher the effect of interest payments will be
on cash flow. Table 8 shows the elasticity of cash flow with respect to the market interest
rate for the average firm in the samples. Italy and Spain again display higher values for
this elasticity. Presumably this is due to high nominal interest rates for both countries
during the years of investigation.
Table 10 presents the effect on the growth rate of the capital stock (or investment) of a
transitory increase of 1% of the interest rate through the effect on cash flow. The effects
are in general relatively small in all countries. Consider again a 50 bp increase in a market
interest rate from 5% to 5.50%. Such a policy experiment would lead, after the first year,
to a contemporaneous 0.2% decrease in investment in Germany, 0.4% in France, 2.4% in







Germany France Italy Spain
T -0.02 -0.04 -0.24 -0.11
T+1 -0.03 -0.12 -0.28 -0.18
T+2 -0.04 -0.15 -0.31 -0.18
T+3 -0.05 -0.17 -0.33 -0.20
+ '

This paper presents a comparable set of results on the monetary transmission channels on
firm investment for the four largest countries of the euro area. We focus on two different
channels that affect investment. The interest channel is operative when market interest
fluctuations change the user cost of capital and hence investment. The broad credit chan-
nel is operative when market interest fluctuations change the balance-sheet condition and
the available cash flow of firms and, through this, investment. This paper is the first to
provide an investigation of those two channels for the four largest economies of the euro
area, based on results from a unique comparative study using large firm databases for each27
country, containing a total of over 215,000 observations from 1985 to 1999. Its emphasis
on using large micro-datasets makes this exercise an important complement to the vast
macro-literature in which euro-area countries are compared.
We find investment to be sensitive to user cost changes in all those four countries. Most of
the effect of user cost changes is born within the first two years. This implies an operative
interest channel in these euro-area countries. We also find investment in all those coun-
tries to be quite sensitive to sales and cash flow movements. Furthermore, we have inves-
tigated whether significant differences exist between large and small firms in investment
behaviour. We find that only in Italy do smaller firms react more to cash flow movements.
We argue that size might not be the right indicator in all countries to investigate the broad
credit channel.28
APPENDIX
A: Cleaning of the samples:
All the samples were cleaned for outliers by removing percentiles from the variables used
in the regression. More details can be found in von Kalckreuth (2001), Gaiotti and Gener-
ale (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001).
B. Definition of the user cost variable
The user cost is constructed as
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,  the investment price,  the value-added price,
τ  the highest marginal corporate tax rate,
δ  the depreciation rate.
AI: apparent interest rate, as interest payment over gross debt
D: gross debt
LD: long-term debt rate
E: book value of equity
z: present value of depreciation allowances
itc: investment tax credit.
C. Simulation
In this appendix we explain the calculation of the elasticity of investment with respect to
user cost, sales and cash flow. It is largely based on an idea developed and explained to us
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and the capital accumulation equation,  W W W 1 . . + − = − 1 ) 1 ( δ
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Let us now consider, starting in period t, a shock to  W  ∆  of 1% (0.01), define 
V
W   as the
corresponding new value of  W   and define 
V
W . τ +  as the corresponding new value of  τ + W . .
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and so on. Given a baseline path for CF/K and g, these equations allow us to recursively
compute all values of  τ η + W . The elasticity of the capital stock is then given by 100* τ η + W .
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. 1  as well as the30
values of the depreciation rate. To keep the calculations as simple as possible we have as-








where  is assumed to be equal to the average growth of sales in each country; given δ  we
then have:
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We have also used the baseline path of CF/K to be the sample average of this variable in
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and so on. We assume that  remains constant in the baseline path.31
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